Rand, Rothbard, and Rights Reconsidered

Comments

B.R. Merrick's picture

I'm sorry, but in spite of this woman being obviously very smart and studious, the problems I have with her premises are legion.

First of all, this is the first time I have heard of the "right to retaliation." (Forgive me, but I am, after all, a confirmed doofus.) Having explained it, I understand where she's coming from, but it once again brings up the issue of "rights," which, to me, are nothing more than individual observations of natural phenomena. They are logical (or somewhat logical) conclusions, but not necessary in my view. But the problems only worsen from here, and it's probably a result of my disagreement with the above premise.

"Rand’s justification for this is that if private individuals took justice into their own hands, this would lead to thuggery and mob rule (1964c, 108–109)." How so? We have mob rule right now. If the government imploded tomorrow, the majority (or mob) on this land mass would rush right back to Washington, D.C. in a violent effort to re-establish "our heritage." The government is a group of individuals who take justice into their own hands.

From the footnotes: "In a state of nature (anarchy)..." Finally! We agree. Anarchy is natural. This is what Stefan Molyneux tried to bring up in "Everyday Anarchy," I believe.

"For example, if a person had to choose between telling the truth or not to a Nazi storm trooper as to the whereabouts of a Jew whom he has hidden, then lying would be called for (see Machan 1998b, 27)." Okay, this may be off the subject a bit, but I disagree here also. Lying is never "called for," and I'm speaking here as one who has lied. None of my previous lies was ever justified, only the cowardly way of dealing with a fearful situation. The ideal, when confronted by a Nazi officer demanding answers, is to say, "I will not tell you where I have hidden my Jewish friend, you death-oriented f*ck." I only read "Atlas Shrugged" once, but I'm quite certain that John Galt never lied, did he? Even being tortured is no excuse for lying, although it is certainly understandable. To lie is to initiate coercion, as it were, against the truth, which is immovable and an essential component of volition. Every lie I ever told was death-oriented.

"Retribution may also include punishment (incarceration), particularly if the person is a potential threat to others." Define "threat," and explain why anyone should ever be punished. If someone initiates coercion against me, I want the coercion to stop, and to be compensated if desired, and that's that. If I cannot be compensated, then I want to be left alone. The minute I want someone to be punished, I am, in essence, desirous of revenge, which is initiatorily coercive, and death-oriented. To this day, I indulge vengeful fantasies based on earlier hurts, and I now acknowledge that such thinking is death-oriented, which is factual, as based on my article "Coercion Is Death."

"I argue that it is morally incumbent upon a person to retaliate if his rights have been violated by another." Define "morally," and how this stacks up against "Then said Jesus, Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do" (Luke 23:34), or "So likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses" (Matthew 18:35). That's about two thousand years worth of philosophy she's going up against. She'd better know her stuff, but based on the premises thus far that I've read, she's not convincing me. I don't believe in Jesus anymore, but I consider myself a "Post-Christian," meaning that the wisdom in the Four Gospels is so massive, that I think everyone ought to be familiar with it. And when I say "ought," I mean that I want everyone to be familiar with it. We'd all be a lot better off.

"Virtues, like living beings, are mortal." Define "virtue," and the only living things known to science are plants and animals. Perhaps this was a metaphor, or hyperbole? Unless there's some super-smart sci-fi geek out there that can enlighten me further. In the article I've already mentioned, "Coercion Is Death," I use death to describe the death of volition, relationships, and wealth because I see these three things as being inseparable or crucial to individuality, which is indeed living. I'm living it now. And loving it.

"A case could be made that if A contracts for B to perform in the leading role of a play three days hence, and B fails to do so, then A has a right to compensation (payment for damages or some equivalent of that). The basis for this would be the Principle of Reciprocity. However, Rothbard would counter that B cannot alienate his will. That is, the actor has the right not to show up. Such an agreement or contract is unenforceable." Rothbard is correct. This is why theatrical producers hire understudies, and why they write the checks.

"I believe that the right to life implies that the accused as well as those incarcerated are entitled to physical integrity; that is, their punishment should not result in cruel or unusual pain and suffering." Define "physical integrity," and how this integrity does not include my ability to physically move myself to the location I desire, if by chance, I ever find myself falsely accused and convicted by the government that needs to initiate coercion on behalf of children's "rights." Furthermore, please also define "cruel or unusual," a definition that has devolved so far down that it now merely means "organ failure."

I never even got to the part where she talks about children and their "needs," and I don't think I will. I cannot comprehend that whatever argument she uses would answer any of the above. I appreciate her efforts, and she’s on her way to something I can agree with, but not nearly far enough.

tzo's picture

"If someone initiates coercion against me, I want the coercion to stop, and to be compensated if desired, and that's that. If I cannot be compensated, then I want to be left alone. The minute I want someone to be punished, I am, in essence, desirous of revenge, which is initiatorily coercive, and death-oriented."

Scenario 1: Armed robber tries to take the $100 you have in your pocket. You knock the gun out of his hand, break his nose, and he runs away, howling.

Scenario 2: Armed robber takes your $100, then as he tries to make his getaway you tackle him, knock the gun away, break his nose, and retrieve your $100 from him while he howls in pain.

Scenario 3: Armed robber takes your $100 and escapes. One week later you recognize him as you pass him on the street. You break his nose and take $100 from him.

In scenario 1 you retain your property by defending it.
In scenario 2 you lose your property and then use force to take it back.
In scenario 3 you lose your property and then use force to take it back after some time passes.

It looks to me like a fitting punishment for taking, or trying to take $100 from someone, is a broken nose. Whether this punishment is administered during, immediately after, or long after the aggression, seems trivial.

At some level, then,
Punishment = Self Defense

B.R. Merrick's picture

In all three scenarios you laid out, it looks to me like they all fall under:

"I want the coercion to stop, and to be compensated if desired."

If you desire compensation, then scenarios 1, 2, and 3 are all doable. Punishment is irrelevant.

tzo's picture

"Punishment is irrelevant."

I haven't thought all this out completely, so here is a brain dump:

In all the scenarios, the thief ends up with a broken nose for his profitless effort. Is this not punishment?

Consider scenario 3a: After breaking his nose, you discover he has no money.

Are you now the aggressor because he already spent your money? What if he told you he didn't have your money first, and you decided to break his nose anyway? You become the aggressor simply because he has already spent your cash? What if he hands you your cash when he sees you. Now you're all even? No harm no foul?

Perhaps a better scenario involves physical aggression. Someone attacks you and you:

a) successfully defend yourself by bludgeoning your attacker
b) an MMA fighter happens by and thrashes the attacker for you
c) you get beat up

If c), then what happens later if you confront the attacker and demand restitution? What restitution? Money? Perhaps, but what if he is a rich bully who likes to beat up folks? Here's your money, I'll see you next week for another beating. What if you permanently lost sight in one eye? What is your restitution price in dollars for that loss? What if he can't pay?

If you were to 'punish' him by 'seeking revenge' and getting an 'eye for an eye' by beating him up a week after he assaulted you, are you now the aggressor? If it was 'just' to beat him to a pulp while he was attacking you, and if it was 'just' for someone to jump in and beat him in order to save you, why is it 'unjust' to beat him up a week later, or hire someone else to do it, if you encounter him on the street? Time has passed, is all the difference. Is that a critical difference?

It seems that whatever force you may reasonably have expected to employ to defend yourself and your property is a reasonable amount of force to employ as punishment against a person who has gotten away with your stuff or has beaten you up. It is also a reasonable 'interest payment' if he does reimburse you.

If someone takes $100 from you, and you 'only' demand it back, how is that not 'an eye for an eye?' How is that not vengeance?

If the worst that could happen if a person stole a car would be that he would had to give the car back, how would that work out?

Quite honestly, I don't have any clear idea what is the correct formulation for all of this, but it's kinda fun to chew on.

B.R. Merrick's picture

Interesting scenarios, and I don't think I have the ability to sort through them all at once, but Scenario 3a is a new one. In the first three scenarios, I interpreted the nose punching as a way to distract the thief in order to retrieve the stolen money. If it's gratuitous nose punching, it may still be retributive in an "eye for an eye" sense, or perhaps I'll come down on the side of unnecessary coercion. I haven't decided yet, but 3a is new to me.

And it is fun to chew on!

Suverans2's picture

"If it was 'just' to beat him to a pulp while he was attacking you, and if it was 'just' for someone to jump in and beat him in order to save you, why is it 'unjust' to beat him up a week later, or hire someone else to do it, if you encounter him on the street? Time has passed, is all the difference. Is that a critical difference?" ~ tzo

Yes, there is a critical difference, the first two are for defense, the second appears to be strictly for retaliation, and retaliation is not restitution.

Suverans2's picture

At some level, then,
Punishment = Self Defense
~ tzo

For what it's worth, I totally agree with that statement.

Suverans2's picture

In defense of Ayn Rand.

Ayn Rand stated in her treatise entitled Man's Rights (http://tinyurl.com/5sjfuh) was, “A civilized society is one in which physical force is banned from human relationships—in which the government, acting as a policeman, may use force only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use”.

And, in her dissertation entitled The Nature of Government (http://tinyurl.com/ybroc2y ) she wrote, “The necessary consequence of man’s right to life is his right to self-defense. In a civilized society, force may be used only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use. All the reasons which make the initiation of physical force an evil, make the retaliatory use of physical force a moral imperative. ”

As we can all see, Ayn makes no mention of a “right to retaliation”, per se, she correctly, (IMO), only speaks of the individual's natural “right to self-defense”.

Now, let us define “retaliation”.

RETALIA'TION, n. 1. The return of like for like; the doing that to another which he has done to us; requital of evil. ~ Webster's 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language

Requital, “in a bad sense”, can mean "punishment, as the requital of evil deeds" (Ibid.).

By way of example, is Ayn saying, if a man murders someone's child, that individual has the "right to retaliation", i.e. the right to “...return of like for like”, that is to say, that he may rightfully murder the murder's child? Or, is she saying that he has the right to “requital of evil”, that he may rightfully “punish” the murderer for what he has done? Hopefully, we can all agree that Ayn meant the latter, because logically one does not have a natural right to initiate force, in this case against that innocent child.

I'm sure all the rational individuals here at STR will agree that evil deeds can “rightfully” be punished. (It is not the purpose of this comment to discuss who's prerogative it is to punish the perpetrator.) So, why did Ayn use the word “retaliation”?

I can only surmise that she used that word as a way to limit the extent of “punishment”, that is to say, it was her peculiar way of saying, “the punishment must fit the crime”.

B.R. Merrick's picture

You may believe that the punishment must fit the crime, but however the punishment fits will be entirely arbitrary. And if retaliation can be used against the initiation of coercion, then why may I not retaliate against a group of individuals who claim lordship over me solely to protect my "rights"?

And just so you know, I very much enjoyed "Atlas Shrugged." In spite of my disagreements with her on some points, I think Ayn Rand was a fascinating individual.

Suverans2's picture

"You may believe that the punishment must fit the crime, but however the punishment fits will be entirely arbitrary." ~ B.R. Merrick

Actually, I may or may not, but what I was saying is that perhaps that is what Ayn was inferring by her use of the word "retaliation". That aside you state "however the punishment fits will be entirely arbitrary." "[E]ntirely arbitrary" seems a bit strong, did you perhaps mean to say somewhat arbitrary?

"And if retaliation can be used against the initiation of coercion, then why may I not retaliate against a group of individuals who claim lordship over me solely to protect my "rights"?" ~ B.R. Merrick

Within reason, you may, but do they, in fact, merely "claim" lordship over you, or would it be more accurate to say, they "presume" lordship over you?

Implied consent is that manifested by signs, actions, or by facts, or by inaction or silence, WHICH RAISE A PRESUMPTION THAT THE CONSENT HAS BEEN GIVEN. ~ A Dictionary of Law (c.1891), page 263 [Emphasis added]

Do we imply consent by giving "signs" that we have consented? Did we "sign" things that we should not have "signed"?

Are our "actions" those of semi-sovereigns or those of subjects?

Can the STATE show, by way of "facts", that we ask for and/or accept member-only benefits?

Do we imply consent by way of "inaction or silence", that is to say, have we ever formally rebutted the "presumption" of consent?

I, too, disagree with Ayn on some points, and strongly, I might add, but we'll save that for another time.

B.R. Merrick's picture

Yes, Suverans2, I would say that however the punishment fits will be somewhat arbitrary. That's better than "entirely." And how we are presumed to give consent also appears to be somewhat arbitrary, but I'm not going to concern myself with what statists presume when I ignore some of their drivel, although your questions prompt many deep thoughts.

For example, did the death-oriented census taker, who finally got me yesterday, presume that I wish to cooperate, or did he infer by my reluctance that I despise his prying into my private life? Stay tuned, for what will probably be my next article.