A June 23^rd article in The New York Times by reporters David Johnston and William J. Broad quotes (unidentified) investigators as saying the anthrax mailed to the office of Senator Leahy was no more than two years old. That determination was said to have been made using the radio carbon dating process.

William Broad seems to be the favorite of "investigators" (read FBI), as he has written numerous articles on the anthrax mystery laying out the current "thinking" of those investigators, even when they contradict earlier leaks.

Another favorite of the FBI, although this time a critic, appears to be Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Program for the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). Rosenberg seems to be privy to some inside information from the investigation but just enough to offer (justified) criticism of the investigation and to buttress the FBI’s pet theory. That theory, based on a "profile" issued by the FBI several months ago, assumes the preparation of the weaponized anthrax, as well as the mailings, are the work of one single individual. Rosenberg seems to have bought that scenario completely and thinks she knows the identity of that individual.

Evidently, the carbon dating information was fed to only one source, The New York Times. The wide publicity given the information in other papers and on TV news is based on that Johnston/Broad article. There is no reason to question the authenticity of the carbon dating information. (It would be too easy to contradict.)  Where the spin comes in is the conclusions to be drawn from that information. Here the "investigators" are clearly making an unwarranted stretch.

The age of the anthrax specimens of no more than two years would rule out anyone who did not have access to the Ames strain developed at the army’s weapons program at Ft. Detrick in the last two years. However, the article points out that the perpetrator could prepare more anthrax given such recent knowledge and capability.

The rest of the article is devoted to lauding the intensity and scope of the FBI investigation. It cites over 5,000 interviews conducted and more than a thousand grand jury subpoenas served. According to investigators, hundreds of polygraph (lie detector) tests have been administered, including a three-hour session with William Patrick III.

The Patrick interrogation is curious in itself. Patrick is the inventor (or at least holds five secret patents) of the process that developed the unique anthrax spore concentration of one trillion per gram, the same concentration found in the mailed anthrax. He is the former chief of product development of bio-weapons at Ft. Detrick. Patrick is also a consultant to Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI), a CIA-connected government contractor. (See this writer’s three-part series, "Anthrax, GOCO’s and Killer Germs," which covers BMI in depth, including its involvement in managing or co-managing four secret government labs, including the Army’s Dugway, Utah facility where the anthrax is weaponized.)

Patrick is also a close friend and colleague of Ken Alibek. Alibek is the Americanized name of the former number two man in the Soviet Union’s bioweapon program. He defected to the U.S. in 1992. At the request of the CIA, Alibek was debriefed by Patrick and was subsequently welcomed with open arms into the U.S. intelligence community. Alibek is also a former employee of BMI.

On December 21, 2001 The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch newspaper reported that FBI Director Robert Meuller had assured Senator Mike DeWine of Ohio that no one with or formerly with Battelle is a suspect. BMI headquarters is in Columbus, Ohio.

A few short days after the Johnston/Broad article, the FBI narrowed its investigation to microbiologist Steven J. Hatfill. Through leaks to various news organizations, Hatfill’s involvement in research programs at Ft. Detrick appeared in numerous media. Camera crews were on hand to film the FBI hauling things away from Hatfill’s apartment near Ft. Detrick.

Stories revealed that Hatfill had been terminated from a research project at Ft. Detrick in August 2001. Hatfill says he was fired because of publicity about him being a possible suspect in the anthrax mailings. Other stories say his (Top Secret) security clearance either expired or was revoked for unknown reasons. (This, of course, would give a "revenge" motive, another part of the FBI profile.)

Hatfill participated with William Patrick (said to be his mentor) in a 1999 study of the consequences of mailing anthrax. Some believe that study may have been the template for the anthrax mailings closely following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

However, the study was flawed in two respects. It did not contemplate the use of the new one trillion-spore concentration, the diameter of which is smaller than the pores in the average envelope. Nor did it take into account the pressure exerted by mail sorting machines.

Barbara Rosenberg and others theorize that one scenario might be the mailings were intended to raise the public awareness of the need for biological and chemical warfare defensive measures, and no deaths were expected.  That it would also result in a huge increase in the demand for pharmaceuticals would not surprise industry officials involved in discussions of the subject in Washington.

Whether planned or not, the anthrax mailings have resulted in large government orders for pharmaceutical products and the passage of draconian laws by the Congress.

A puzzling Defense Department program in Nevada, the only logical purpose of which was to buttress the FBI theory of lone individual perpetrators of chemical/biological events, was disclosed in a New York Times article by Judith Miller just seven days before the 9/11 attacks and two weeks before the anthrax mailing to NBC.

Using the acronym BACHUS (Biotechnology Activity Characterization by Unconventional Signatures), the project had two ostensible purposes. Miller describes it:

"CAMP 12, NEVADA TEST SITE, Nevada -- In a nondescript mustard-colored building that was once a military recreation hall and barbershop, the Pentagon has built a germ factory that could make enough lethal microbes to wipe out entire cities.

Adjacent to the pool tables, the shuffleboard and the bar stands a gleaming stainless steel cylinder, the 50-liter (53-quart) fermenter in which germs can be cultivated.

The apparatus, which includes a latticework of pipes and other equipment, was made entirely with commercially available components bought from hardware stores and other suppliers for about $1 million--a pittance for a weapon that could deliver death on such a large scale.

The factory was built by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, an arm of the Pentagon that works to contain the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Officials said the project was intended to assess how hard it would be for a terrorist or rogue nation to assemble a germ factory."

The second stated objective was to see if such a homemade lab would have an identifiable signature. The founder and first director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is Jay C. Davis. Among other things, Davis is a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) member, a 30-year associate at the secret Lawrence Livermore weapons lab and a consultant to the CIA.

Davis made the astounding admission that the Pentagon had never revealed the existence of Project BACHUS to anyone at the Clinton White House nor to Congressional intelligence committees. The program was started in 1997 under Defense Secretary William Cohen (CFR).

According to Miller’s article, the project never produced anything more than a couple of relatively harmless pesticides. However, this is a far cry from making a weaponized powder such as the mailed anthrax. That takes a lot more expertise and expensive equipment.

Miller says the Times requested information about the project and Davis got permission to bring her and an ABC camera crew out to the facility. There is no indication that ABC has done anything with the story that this writer can find.

If the intent of the Times article and the BACHUS program was to convince the public that a lone individual could have been responsible for the mailed anthrax, they have earned "Maggie’s Drawers" (a military term for the flag waved when a shooter misses the target completely).

However, a second program also begun in 1997 may be more relevant to the mailed anthrax mystery.

According to the BIOHAZARD NEWS publication, "a 1997 article in a scientific journal reported that Russian scientists had implanted into the anthrax microbe genes that cause food poisoning, producing a strain that was resistant to Russia's anthrax vaccine." (Could Alibek have planted the story?)

At any rate, U.S. authorities requested a sample from Russia with which to test the U.S. vaccine but were unsuccessful when Russia denied ever having produced such a strain. Thus was born "the Jefferson Project." The CIA was tasked with developing more deadly anthrax bacteria to use in testing U.S. vaccines. The CIA chose its often-used contractor Battelle (BMI) to host the project.

Production was to be at Battelle’s state-of-the-art facility for making aerosol products for commercial and military use. Some researchers believe this may be the facility at which William Patrick perfected the process that resulted in the one trillion-spore concentration rather than at the Army’s Dugway, Utah facility, which is also controlled by Battelle. The aerosol facility is located in Jefferson, Ohio, hence the name of the project. No results of the project have been announced.

Yet another CIA program, "Clear Vision," has no relevance toward solving the mailed anthrax question, but has clear implications for future events.

Again from BIOHAZARD NEWS, "In 1997, the Central Intelligence Agency embarked on the 'Clear Vision' project, which focused on weapons systems that would deliver the germs. First, CIA agents tried to find or buy a small, Soviet-designed biological bomb, which releases germs in a fine mist. When the search failed, the agency approved a plan to make a mock bomblet, based on intelligence information, and study how efficiently such a weapon could disperse a load of microbes."

Once again, BMI was chosen for the project. Two tests were completed on a prototype measuring dissemination characteristics and how the model performed under different atmospheric conditions. Does the term, much in the news of late, "dirty bomb" come to mind?

The CIA maintains, through spokesperson Bill Harlow, that the device does not violate the 1972 treaty on Chemical and Biological Weapons because, "it lacked a fuse and did not contain dangerous germs."

If FBI Director Mueller’s assurances to Senator DeWine are kept and no present or former BMI operatives will be pursued, and the CIA is obviously off limits to the FBI, there may be no resolution of the mailed anthrax case unless . . . unless a suspect can be found to fit the FBI "profile" or the perception can be created that some microbiologist is a fit. 

Perhaps The Hartford Courant newspaper’s headline on the FBI’s public "investigation" of Steven Hatfill sums it up best. It read, "The Case of Dr. Hatfill: Suspect Or Pawn."