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In the Gunsight: Syria by Uri Avnery
The
same thing happens in the biggest gamble of all: war. The leaders that
start a war and get stuck in the mud are compelled to fight their way
ever deeper into the mud. That is a part of the very essence of war: it
is impossible to stop after a failure. Public opinion demands the
promised victory. Incompetent generals need to cover up their failure.
Military commentators and other armchair strategists demand a massive
offensive. Cynical politicians are riding the wave. The government is
carried away by the flood that they themselves have let loose. That
is what happened this week, following the battle of Bint-Jbeil, which
the Arabs have already started to call proudly Nasrallahgrad. All over A
day after the bloody battle, the cabinet decided on a massive
mobilization of the reserves. What for? The ministers do not know. But
it does not depend on them anymore, nor on the generals. The political
and military leadership is tossed about on the waves of war like a boat
without a rudder. As
has been said before: It is much easier to start a war than to finish
one. The cabinet believes that it controls the war, but in reality it is
the war that controls them. They have mounted a tiger, and can't be sure
of getting off without being torn to pieces. War
has its own rules. Unexpected things happen and dictate the next moves.
And the next moves tend to be in one direction: escalation. DAN
HALUTZ, the father of this war, thought that he could eliminate
Hizbullah by means of the Air Force, the most sophisticated, most
efficient and the generally most-most air force in the world. A few days
of massive pounding, thousands of tons of bombs on neighborhoods, roads,
electricity works and ports--and that's it. Well,
that wasn't it, as it turned out. The Hizbullah rockets continued to
land in the north of First
they wanted to annihilate the Hizbullah positions along the border. When
it was seen that that was not enough, it was decided to conquer the
hills that dominate the border. There, the Hizbullah fighters were
waiting and caused heavy casualties. And the rockets continued to fly. Now
the generals are convinced that there is no alternative to occupying the
whole area up to the And
then? The Israeli army will be extended over a large area, and
everywhere it will be exposed to guerilla attacks, of the sort Hizbullah
excels in. And the missiles will continue to fly. What
next? One cannot stop. Public opinion will demand more decisive moves.
Political demagogues will shout. Commentators will grumble. The people
in the shelters will cry out. The generals will feel the heat. One
cannot keep tens of thousands of reserve soldiers mobilized
indefinitely. It is impossible to prolong a situation which paralyzes a
third of the country. Everybody
will clamor to storm forwards. Where to? Towards THE
CABINET ministers recite in unison: No! Never ever! We shall not attack Perhaps
some of them really don't intend to. They do not dream of a war with When
it becomes clear that nothing is helping, that Hizbullah goes on
fighting and the rockets continue to fly, the political and military
leadership will face bankruptcy. They will need to pin the blame on
somebody. On who? Well, on Assad, of course. How
is it possible that a small "terror organization," with a few
thousand fighters altogether, goes on fighting? Where do they get the
arms from? The finger will point towards Even
now, the army commanders assert that new rockets are flowing all the
time from Then
the generals will demand the bombing of roads and bridges inside EHUD
OLMERT and Amir Peretz did not think about that when they decided 17
days ago in haste and lightheartedly, without serious debate, without
examining other options, without calculating the risks, to attack
Hizbullah. For politicians who do not know what war is, it was an
irresistible temptation: there was a clear provocation by Hizbullah,
international support was assured, what a wonderful opportunity! They
would do what even Dan
Halutz submitted an offer that could not be refused. A nice little war.
Military plans were ready and well rehearsed. Certain victory. The more
so, since on the other side there was no real enemy army, just a
"terror organization." How
hotly the desire was burning in the hearts of Olmert and Peretz is
attested by the fact that they did not even think about the lack of
shelters in the Northern towns, not to mention the far-reaching economic
and social implications. The main thing was to rush in and gather the
laurels. They
had no time to think seriously about the war aim. Now they resemble
archers who shoot their arrows at a blank sheet and then draw the rings
around the arrow. The aims change daily: to destroy Hizbullah, to disarm
them, to drive them out of THE
MORE the nice little war continues, the clearer it becomes that these
changing aims are not realistic. The Lebanese ruling group does not
represent anybody but a small, rich and corrupt elite. The Lebanese army
cannot and will not fight Hizbullah. The new "security zone"
will be exposed to guerilla attacks and the international force will not
enter the area without the agreement of Hizbullah. And this guerilla
force, Hizbullah, the Israeli army cannot vanquish. That
is nothing to be ashamed of. Our army is in good--or, rather,
bad--company. The term "guerilla" ("small war") was
coined in When
Napoleon did not know what to do next, he invaded Condoleezza
Rice's stubborn struggle against any attempt to stop the war shows that
this is indeed the aim of the By
the way: One day before the outbreak of this war, our Minister of
National Infrastructures, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, took part in the
inauguration ceremony of the big pipeline that will conduct oil from the
huge Caspian Sea reserves to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, just next to
the Syrian border. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline avoids MUST
THE sliding into a war with Of
course there is. To stop now, at once. When
President Lyndon Johnson felt that he was sinking into the morass of We
can do that. To stop investing more and more in a losing business. To be
satisfied with what we can get now. For example: an agreement that will
move Hizbullah a few kilometers from the border, along which an
international force and/or the Lebanese army will be deployed, and to
exchange prisoners. Olmert will be able to present that as a great
victory, to claim that we have got what we wanted, that we have taught
the Arabs a lesson, that anyhow we had no intention of achieving more.
Nasrallah will also claim a great victory, asserting that he has taught
the Zionist Enemy a lesson it will not forget, that Hizbullah remains
alive, strong and armed, that he has brought back the Lebanese
prisoners. True,
it will not be much. But that is what can be done to cut losses, as they
say in the business world. That
can happen. If Olmert is clever enough to extricate himself from the
trap, before it closes entirely. (As folk wisdom says: a clever person
is one that gets out of a trap that a wise one would not have got into
in the first place.) And if Condoleezza gets orders from her boss to
allow it. ON
THE 17th day of the war , we must recognize that soon we will be faced
with a clear choice: to slide into a war with Olmert and Peretz did not think about that in those intoxicating moments on July 12, when they jumped at the opportunity to start a nice little war. But then, were they thinking at all? discuss this column in the forum Uri Avnery is a peace activist. |