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Why Is the Drug Market Violent? by Bob Murphy
Even
though this type of argument is now standard, I think many who use it
aren’t quite sure why it’s so.
Thus let me offer a few reasons in the present article: (1)
DRUG DEALERS ARE “OUTLAWS” Simply
put, people who deal in prohibited markets cannot turn to official
channels to resolve disputes or protect their rights.
(Anarchists might wonder whether anyone has his rights
protected by the police and courts, but let’s not worry about that now.)
If you advance ten pounds of cocaine to someone who promises to pay
you after he has sold it in smaller quantities to his customers, and
months go by without him paying you back, what are you supposed to do?
You can’t call the cops or the Better Business Bureau.
But you can’t ignore it, either, if you don’t want other people
to start ripping you off too. Violence is an obvious recourse. (2)
DRUG DEALS INVOLVE VALUABLE PRODUCT AND CASH Movies
are full of drug deals “gone bad,” but you never read about a sit-down
between two telecom giants during a merger proposal, which falls apart
when one group pulls out AK-47s. One
of the major reasons for this, of course, is that even though the telecom
merger may involve billions of dollars, that money isn’t sitting in the
room in a suitcase. (3)
THE MARGINAL BENEFITS OF VIOLENCE ARE HIGHER IN A PROHIBITED MARKET Prohibition
greatly increases the street price of drugs.
In a standard econ diagram, the supply curve for something like
cocaine shifts way to the left, so that the original demand and new supply
curve intersect at a much higher price.
Intuitively, potential drug dealers must earn much larger monetary
returns in order to compensate them for all the risks of becoming an
illegal merchant. This
is why drug dealers are so intent on getting new clients, to the point
where they may even give samples for free initially, and then charge
when the new client comes back for more.
(Sales reps from Jim Beam rarely do this.)
To add one more customer might mean, say, an extra $100 a week in
profit for a drug dealer, whereas a liquor store owner does not profit
nearly as much from persuading a customer to patronize his store rather
than the competitor’s down the street.
(Even if the customer is a drunk who spends $100 a week on
booze, this doesn’t translate into an extra $100 in his pocket, because
the alcohol market is competitive and the wholesale price of the liquor is
bid up considerably more than the wholesale price of heroin or cocaine.) This
reasoning shows that a drug gang stands to gain possibly thousands of
extra dollars per week if it can seize distribution “rights” on a
given corner in a busy neighborhood from a rival gang.
No such incentive exists for a hot dog vendor to eliminate his
competitor on the next block. (4)
THE MARGINAL COSTS OF VIOLENCE ARE LOWER IN A PROHIBITED MARKET If
you are a major drug dealer, you’re already breaking scores of
laws for which you could be put away for life.
Depending on the scope of your operation, you’re also possibly
paying off dozens of police, parole officers, judges, and politicians.
The very fact that you chose to become a drug dealer indicates that
you’re the type of person who doesn’t care too much about the opinion
of respectable society, and that jail does not horrify you the way it does
most other people. In this
context, then, the marginal cost of killing one of your competitors is far
less to you than it would be to executives in legal industries.
(Let’s not worry about the problem of interpersonal utility
comparisons; you get my point, I hope.) The
above are four major reasons that prohibited markets are more violent than
legal ones. If we would end
the ridiculous and evil War on Drugs, many of the horrors associated with
drugs would disappear overnight. discuss this column in the forum Bob Murphy has a Ph.D. in economics from New York University. He is the author of Chaos Theory and has a personal website. |