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Yes, Minister! by Uri Avnery
Take
an honorable retired judge, a doddering old fool, and put him in charge
of the inquiry, with a sizable honorarium. Help him to arrive himself at
the required conclusions. Feed him the appropriate facts and hint at a
peerage. From there on, everything will work out as desired. Of
course, the commissions are not really intended to discover the truth.
Their purpose is whitewash. In order to understand what has happened, no
honorable judge, Lord, former senator or retired Mossad operative is
required. Simple common sense will do. Clearly,
he who appoints a commission of Inquiry decides in advance what the
conclusions will be. When a member of the Establishment is appointed to
investigate the Establishment, the conclusion will be that the
Establishment has committed no wrong. In
(The
conclusions were so scandalous that the general public rose up against
them. The commission’s report was thrown into the waste basket, but
Golda and Dayan were forced to resign.) In
the In
Now
three commissions are at work. The Israeli one, which was appointed in
secret and works in secret, will finish first. After that, it will be
the turn of the British one (which is required to investigate only the
intelligence community, after the honorable Lord judge has investigated
the political structure). In the end, well after the election in the President
George W. Bush dragged the Prime
Minister Tony Blair told his people that Saddam could use WMD against
British cities within 45 minutes (Not 40, not 50, but exactly 45). In
Well,
the Americans and British occupied So,
how come all these illustrious intelligence agencies were wrong? What
made them feed their political leaders with false information and cause
Bush, Blair & Co. to start a war in which a country was devastated
and many human beings killed? Common
sense would say: Bush & Blair were “deceived,” because they
wanted to be deceived. Bush and the Neo-cons who have taken over Did
the political leaders explicitly demand that their intelligence
organizations supply them with mendacious reports? Perish the thought!
The commissions of inquiry will affirm that no such thing happened. And
correctly so. The leaders did not ask for this, because there was no
need to ask. The American, British and Israeli intelligence chiefs knew
perfectly well what was required of them and delivered the goods. They
knew which side their bread was buttered on. Did
the intelligence people deliberately falsify their information to
achieve this? There was no need. The intelligence community collects
enormous quantities of information. From this huge pile they are
supposed to extract the items that they consider credible. Surprisingly
enough, the credible material is always that which the political leaders
desire. The
decisive function of every intelligence agency is not the collecting of
the information, but its evaluation. How do the mosaic stones form a
picture? That is a matter of judgment and intuition, both subject to a
general “concept.” This is a mental pattern in the mind of the
intelligence chief. And since the intelligence chiefs are appointed by
the political leaders, no wonder that their concepts almost always suit
the concepts of the leaders. I
predict that all three commissions of inquiry, each in its own country,
will come to the conclusion (a) that the political leaders did not ask
the intelligence people to falsify their reports and did not exert any
pressure on them, (b) that the intelligence people acted honestly and
supplied intelligence evaluations according to their best knowledge and
abilities, (c) that everybody acted according to the best information
available at the time, and (d) that there was a lamentable professional
failure. None
of the three commissions will state the obvious: that the intelligence
agencies are under the jurisdiction of the President (in the If
all the blame is laid at the door of the intelligence people, they
should be looked at. All over the world, they are admired. The mystique
that envelops them creates an almost religious cult that feeds a large
flock of journalists and writers. The intelligence operative pictured in
their stories is a superman like Smiley, John Le Carre’s hero, a
brilliant man endowed with almost superhuman intelligence, a
cold-blooded, sophisticated genius who weaves his nets with incredible
patience. Unfortunately,
such a person does not exist. As one says in English: “army
intelligence” is an oxymoron. How
do I know? There are some simple tests, which every logical person can
apply for himself. First
test: human quality. All intelligence people are eventually pensioned
off, and then they can be viewed from close up, without censorship and
the cover of mystery. And what does one see? Among them there are some
highly intelligent people. There are also quite a number of complete
fools. But most of them are very average, superficial people, with very
ordinary, conformist views. We would not rely on such people to give us
advice on our investments. It is quite shocking to realize that these
people have decided the fate of nations. In
In
an apparatus in which such people dominate, an intelligent person has to
assimilate himself. He adapts in order to survive. Second
test: results. By now it is banal to mention the classical intelligence
failures of World War II. The Russians were surprised by the German
attack on their country, the Americans by the Japanese bombardment of The
American, British and Israeli intelligence agencies did not have the
slightest idea about what was happening in “Does
Saddam have weapons of mass destruction?” “Yes,
Prime Minister!” discuss this column in the forum Uri Avnery is a peace activist. |