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The Epistemology of War Many
who supported the war with Iraq are now shocked—shocked!—to
discover that they may have been misled about the existence of huge
stockpiles of Iraqi WMD waiting to be unleashed on the American
public. What is really shocking is that so many people were
convinced this was true in the first place. Not to say that it might
not be true, but what reason did we have to think it was
true? How did we know that After
all, what evidence did any of us, the regular Joes and Janes,
actually have for the claims being made by the administration and
its fellow travelers in the media? Well, not much, actually. In
fact, the hawks’ arguments essentially boiled down to “Trust
us.” And yet so many of us went along. This
situation highlights a dilemma for the average citizen in the modern
nation-state. Informed consent requires knowledge. But the decisions
made by our rulers are often based on information that most of us
don’t have access to. And, they assure us, we can’t have
access to it because of its highly sensitive nature. Add
to this the fact that governments lie. Not just occasionally, but
systematically. They lie, they spin, they manipulate, they distort.
Not just the Republicans, but the Democrats too. Not just
dictatorships but democracies. Consider
the fact that, prior to the war, almost 50% of Americans believed
that Saddam Hussein was involved in the 9/11 attacks. And now
something like 41% believe
that we have, in fact, found the dreaded WMD. Neither of these
beliefs is true (so far as we know), and yet millions of our
countrymen believe them. Why is this? Because they’ve been
encouraged, in a million subtle and not-so-subtle ways, to believe
them. But
if I am not in a position to know what evidence decisions are based
on, how can I be expected to endorse those decisions? A plausible
principle is that in the case of deciding whether or not to go to
war, the burden of proof should be on those advocating war.
After all, war is the equivalent of capital punishment on a national
scale, and we—rightly—insist on proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in capital cases. Therefore,
the bar of evidence in deciding whether to support a war ought to be
particularly high. If one doesn’t have sufficient evidence to
“convict,” then one shouldn’t support the war. Since there was
a distinct lack of overwhelming evidence in the case of But
the rejoinder is that we should trust our leaders to make the right
decisions. They are good men and wouldn’t commit the nation to war
if they didn’t have good reasons. However, this just pushes the
problem back a step. What evidence do I have that the men making the
decisions are men of good character? I don’t know any of them
personally. And what I do know is filtered through spin-doctors,
image consultants, focus groups and a media that favors the trivial
over the substantive. So
I can only conclude that, based on what I know, I am in no position
to judge a) whether the available evidence justified war with Iraq
or b) whether those who were in a position to judge are
trustworthy men of good character. But to conclude this is to conclude that I cannot support such a war. And, perhaps, could never support any war carried out under similar circumstances. Remember
what we’re being asked to do in supporting a war. We’re being
asked to authorize people to kill and maim on our behalf. And yet,
in doing so, we chronically ask for only the flimsiest of
rationales. Moral integrity demands that we can only support a war,
if ever, when we’re convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
it’s right and necessary. Can anyone deny that there was
reasonable doubt in the case of As
George Washington said, “Government is not reason. It is not
eloquence. It is a force, like fire: a dangerous servant and a
terrible master.” In
advocating an action of the State, we are advocating the use of
force, of violence, to secure certain ends. And war is the ultimate
form of State violence. Why do so many require so little persuasion
to support such violence? It
seems that many people, for a variety of reasons, wanted to believe
that there was a case for invading. Some dreamt of a Pax
Americana and others of wealth. Most average people were
probably just scared, and in the wake of 9/11 will grasp at anything
that gives them a sense of safety and control. But fear, greed and the will to dominate are hardly noble motives. A free people should be willing to face reality head-on and to refuse to give their consent to unjustified violence carried out in their name. And this requires being realistic about what we can know and whom we can trust. discuss this column in the forum Lee McCracken lives in the San Francisco Bay area and works in publishing. He has also written for anti-state.com. |